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Abstract
We analyze a model where a multinational rm can use its su-
perior technology in a foreign subsidiary only after appropriate
training of local managers. Technological spillovers from foreign
direct investment arise when such managers are later hired by a
local rm. Benets for the host economy may also take the form
of the rent that trained managers receive by the foreign aliate
to prevent them from moving to local competitors. We study
conditions under which technological spillovers occur. We also
show that under certain circumstances the multinational rm
might nd it optimal to resort to export instead of foreign direct
investment, to avoid dissipation of its intangible assets.
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1 Introduction
The existence of spillovers from multinational enterprises (MNEs) has often
been indicated as one of the reasons why foreign direct investments (FDIs)
might benet a host economy
1
. Spillovers might take dierent forms.
First, there might exist backward and forward linkages between foreign
aliates and local rms (Lall, 1980, Rodriguez-Clare, 1996). Second, for-
eign aliates might increase local rms' productivity through 'demonstra-
tion eects'. For instance, domestic competitors might successfully imitate
technological innovations introduced by MNEs (Blomstrom, 1986, Manseld
and Romeo, 1980). Third, spillovers arise when subsidiaries of foreign rms
train local employees which will later join local rms or set up their own
companies, bringing with them all (or part of) the technological, marketing,
and managerial knowledge that they have previously acquired.
In this paper, we are concerned with the last form of spillovers, and we
present a model where (technological or managerial) spillovers take place
due to the mobility of workers which have been instructed by a MNE's
subsidiary. Our main purpose is to study the conditions under which such
spillovers occur.
The fact that MNEs undertake substantial eorts in the education of
local workers has been documented in many instances (e.g., see ILO, 1981
and Lindsey, 1986), and empirical research seems to indicate that MNEs
oer more training to technical workers and managers than local rms do
(Gerschenberg, 1987, Chen, 1983). At their early stages aliates rely more
intensively on expatriates , but subsequently they tend to replace them with
(cheaper) local workers who have been properly trained in the meanwhile
(UNLTC, 1993).
We build a model where subsidiaries of MNEs and local rms compete
for the services of local workers who have been previously instructed by the
MNEs. As a result, the MNEs will manage to keep the instructed workers
only if they oer better conditions than the local rms do. MNEs have often
been found to pay higher wages than domestic rms for similar job positions
(UNLTC, 1993, Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey, 1995). However, it has also
been reported that there exists high mobility of trained workers from foreign
aliates to local rms (e.g., see Gerschenberg, 1987, Katz, 1987, ILO, 1981,
World Investment Report, 1992). We are not aware of any empirical study
1
See Blomstrom and Kokko (1996) for an extensive review of spillover eects of the
activities of MNEs.
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which links these two phenomena, but our analysis suggests they are related.
Our model helps identify the circumstances under which workers' mobil-
ity takes place. We nd that the so-called 'joint-prot eect' (or 'eciency
eect') plays an important role here. If the prot made by the MNE when
it can use the technology as a monopolist is higher than the aggregate prot
made by the MNE and the local rm when both can use the technology, then
spillovers will not occur. This is a result which is similar to the one obtained
in the literature which studies persistence of monopolies. More generally,
technology will not diuse to the local rms when they attach a lower value
than the foreign aliate to it. This might be the case, for example, when
some complementary assets not possessed by the local rms are needed to
use eciently the know-how brought by workers.
Finally, a MNE might anticipate that by investing abroad and instruct-
ing local workers to use some particular technology might lead either to
spillovers of knowledge to local rms or to higher wages to prevent workers
from moving. Therefore, it might choose exports instead of FDIs to pro-
tect intangible assets or to avoid the payment of rents to trained workers.
Although our feeling is that this is unlikely to be a major variable in deter-
mining the choice between exports and FDIs, anecdotal evidence conrms
that such a motivation might sometimes be behind the choice of exporting.
An illustrative example is drawn from the history of the chemical sector
(Kudo, 1993). After World War I, the leading German chemical company
IG Farben decided to increase its activity in the growing Japanese market.
At the time, the German chemical industry had a signicant competitive
edge over international competitors and more specically over the Japanese
industry, then at its infant stage. IG Farben resorted to exports and avoided
as much as possible FDI (and licensing) in order to minimize the diusion
of knowledge to competitors.
Other game theoretical models have dealt with the existence of spillovers
from internationalization choices of rms, even though from dierent per-
spectives. In Ethier and Markusen (1996) technological spillovers arise as
a result of a double moral hazard problem. A foreign rm endowed with a
superior technology might renege an exclusive contract with a local licensee
by transferring technology to other local rms, whereas the licensee might
'cheat' by introducing a marginal improvement in the technology after hav-
ing obtained the basic technology from the licensor. Motta (1996) and Siotis
(1997) analyze decisions between exports and FDIs but they simply assume
that when two rms locate in the same region a proportion of their know-
how spills over to each other. This 'black-box' type of spillovers is quite
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familiar in the R&D literature (e.g., d'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a
simple model and draws some rst general results. Section 3 expands our
analysis and considers rst the case of asymmetric information between the
MNE and the local rm about the value of a trained manager and second
some alternative contract specications not considered in the basic model.
Section 4 studies a parametric example to perform some comparative statics
on how certain variables aect the existence of spillovers as well as the choice
between exports and FDIs. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
A rm h (the MNE) has some payo relevant information which can be
thought of as a new technology, a new production process, a new managerial
technique, or a new product. This knowledge has been accumulated prior
to the game and it is exogenously given in our model. It has not been
commercialized yet by rm h in a foreign country, on which market we
focus
2
.
Firm h can either serve the foreign market through exports or estab-
lish a local subsidiary (i.e., make a FDI). We assume that both modes of
involvement give rise to positive prots, and disregard uninteresting cases
where selling in the foreign market is not protable. FDI requires the rm
to transfer its technology to the subsidiary. We assume that such a transfer
is successful only if a local manager is properly informed about the new
technology and that the relevant knowledge cannot be transmitted without
oral communication or on-the-job training.
Apart from the MNE, there also exists a local rm f which could sell the
product if it knew how the technology works. One might think of such a rm
as a company which is producing goods in a related industry. We exclude
the possibility of licensing agreements as a way of technology transfer by
assuming that the costs of contracting upon this knowledge-based asset are
large enough.
The basic features of the game are described in Figure 1.
At time t = 0, rm h decides whether to export or make a FDI. When ex-
porting, the rm will make use of production facilities and properly trained
managers located in the home country. When investing in the host market,
2
Firm h might be the only rm in the world endowed with the new technology. Alter-
natively, it might be the only one that considers to serve that foreign market.
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instead, the rm will have to incur a xed cost G, which includes all the
expenses which should be made to operate in a less well-known foreign en-
vironment. Note that the local rm does not have to incur this cost since
it is already familiar with the local market. We also assume that it is too
expensive for the MNE to move in a stable way a manager from the parent
company to the aliate, for instance because an expatriate worker would
ask for too high a relocation allowance, or because the MNE is located orig-
inally in a country with much higher labor costs, which make it less costly
to train and hire local workers
3
.
The only possible channel to transfer knowledge is to train a local man-
ager. Therefore, if FDI is chosen, a sta of supervisors comes from the
headquarters to the aliate and instructs a local worker. Then they move
back to their home country
4
. The total cost of training a local worker is F .
The worker who receives training is hired from a pool of identical un-
trained workers. She is paid the reservation wage w which is normalized to
zero. We assume that it is impossible for the MNE to write a legally binding
contract which obliges the worker to stay with the company for two periods.
Initially, we also assume that the worker is wealth-constrained and that she
cannot borrow on the nancial market, so that the rst period wage must
be non-negative. We discuss these assumptions in section 3.2.
After receiving proper training, the local manager (henceforth we shall
refer to her as the 'informed' manager) has acquired all the necessary ex-
pertise, knowledge and information to produce the good. At period t = 1,
production takes place, the good is sold and rst-period prots are realized.
Since in this rst period of the game the local rm is not aware of the new
technology, rm h is a monopolist in the market. Its prot is 
E;1
M;h
in the
case of exports and 
I;1
M;h
 
E;1
M;h
in the case of FDI (gross of set up and
training costs).
Afterwards, rm f realizes that it could also appropriate the technol-
ogy by hiring the informed manager. The MNE would like to retain her
within the company to avoid the dissipation of the rents associated with its
knowledge-based asset.
We model this process by assuming that each rm simultaneously and in-
dependently makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the informed manager. The
3
This assumption is made to reproduce what seems to be a realistic situation, but the
analysis would not change much if we assumed that foreign managers might work abroad
on a permanent basis.
4
Alternatively one can think that a local manager is sent abroad to receive the proper
education at the parent company.
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rm who oers more hires the manager and has to pay the wage it has of-
fered. Put dierently, the hiring process works like a rst price auction. If
both rms oer the same wage we assume that the rm with the highest
valuation of the manager hires her (this assumption is made to guarantee
equilibrium in pure strategies). In this section we assume rms have sym-
metric information about the value of the informed manager. In section 3
we study the case of asymmetric information. Also note that we are assum-
ing away the possibility that the local frim might hire workers located in
the home country of the MNE. Therefore, no spillovers can occur when the
MNE chooses to export.
5
We shall focus on the equilibrium where the rm with the highest will-
ingness to pay for the informed manager will hire her by oering exactly the
maximum willingness to pay of the rival
6
. This implies that the informed
manager will appropriate some of the informational rent associated to the
knowledge of how the new technology operates.
The willingness to pay for the informed manager of each rm depends
on the outside options. We assume that if rm f does not hire the informed
manager in the second period it does not have any other possibility to acquire
the technology and therefore it will make zero prots (imitation is therefore
ruled out in our model). If the MNE loses the informed manager, it can
either call back the sta from the headquarters to instruct another local
manager (and incur another cost F ) or it can resort to export from the home
country to serve the host country in the second period. Instead, the MNE
would never prefer to export after having established a subsidiary and kept
the informed manager within the company (by assumption 
I;2
M;h
 
E;2
M;h
).
Note also from Figure 1 that rm h might want to establish a local
subsidiary after having served the market through exports in the rst period.
After the MNE decides about exports or FDI, production takes place
and the second-period payos are realized.
Let us briey summarize some pieces of notation before solving the game.
Denote by 
s;t
k;i
the prot earned by rm i = h; f , in period t = 1; 2, where
5
It seems reasonable to assume that it would be more dicult for the local rm to
identify informed workers if they are in another country, and/or to attract such workers
from abroad if identied.
6
There are other equilibria where both rms oer a wage between the lowest and the
highest valuation of the manager and the rm with the highest valuation hires her. How-
ever, in these equilibria the rm with the lowest valuation is playing a weakly dominated
strategy (compared to oering its own valuation of the manager) and therefore we disre-
gard them.
5
k = M;D (M , for 'monopoly' when only rm h has the technology; D, for
'duopoly' when the local competitor also has it) and s = I; E (I stands
for FDI and E for exports). The superscript s is used only in the prot
expressions of the MNE. Also, denote v
max
i
as the maximum willingness to
pay for the informed manager of rm i.
We look for the sub-game perfect equilibrium in pure strategies of the
game. It is straightforward to solve the model by backward induction. For
expositional reasons we focus initially only on the congurations we consider
more interesting. To this purpose, we introduce two further assumptions
7
.
A1: 
I;2
M;h
  G  F  
E;2
M;h
;
A2: 
I;2
D;h
  F  
E;2
D;h
.
The rst assumption says that the prots from FDI in the second period
(net of set up costs and training costs, which are sunk at the last stage of
the game) are never smaller than the prots from exports. This guarantees
that, in the second period, the MNE always runs a subsidiary in the foreign
country. The second assumption narrows the set of possible alternatives
available to the MNE when the informed manager is hired by the local
rm. It imposes that, in the second period, it is always more protable to
keep the foreign aliate active (this requires the training of another local
manager) than to shut it down and resort to exports. In other words, these
two assumptions say that the MNE never exports in the second period.
Finally, the following additional assumptions allow us to focus on non-
trivial equilibria:
A3: 
I;2
M;h
> 
I;2
D;h
;
A4: 
2
D;f
 F .
Assumption A3 says that a rm makes larger prots when it is a monop-
olist than when it is a duopolist. If this did not hold, as in cases of strong
complementarities with the local rm's production, the MNE would have
an incentive to reveal its technology to the local rm, and spillovers would
trivially occur.
Assumption A4 says that the MNE has to pay more to avoid that the
manager is hired by the other rm (see below) than to train a second man-
ager. If it did not hold, then spillovers would never occur under A3, since
the MNE would always keep the worker.
7
These assumptions could be relaxed without changing the main results (see also section
4), but at the cost of making the analysis far more complex.
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A crucial step to nd the equilibrium solutions is to identify the outcome
of the hiring process. The rm with the highest willingness to pay will hire
the informed manager during the second period. The local rm's maximum
willingness to pay for the informed manager is v
max
f
= 
I;2
D;f
, since it cannot
obtain more than the duopoly prots in the second period. Instead, the
maximum oer of the MNE is given by the dierence between the monopoly
prot it would earn if it kept the informed manager and the duopoly prot
(net of the cost of training a second local worker) it would earn if it lost the
informed manager to the local competitor: v
max
h
= 
I;2
M;h
  
I;2
D;h
+ F .
Therefore two situations are possible: either (a) v
max
h
 v
max
f
, and the
MNE keeps the manager by paying her w = 
I;2
D;f
; or (b) v
max
h
< v
max
f
,
and the local rm hires the informed manager by paying her w = 
I;2
M;h
 

I;2
D;h
+F . In the latter case a technological spillover occurs
8
, since the local
rm manages to appropriate some payo relevant information which it can
acquire only by hiring a worker which has been previously trained by the
MNE.
Note also that in both cases the manager enjoys an informational rent
which puts her total two-period income above that earned by all other work-
ers which were ex-ante identical
9
.
There are three possible equilibrium situations in the version of the game
restricted by assumptions A1 to A4. 1) The MNE establishes a foreign
subsidiary in the rst period but it loses the informed manager in the second
period to the local rm: there exists a technological spillover. The MNE then
instructs another manager and competes with rm h in the second period.
2) The MNE also makes a FDI in the rst period but keeps a monopoly
position in the second period, since it keeps the informed manager. 3) The
MNE exports in the rst period and avoids both dissipation of its knowledge
and an extra wage bill. Since the technology decays after two periods, in
the second period the MNE will invest locally to enjoy higher prots (by
assumption A1).
These are the conditions under which these equilibrium regimes will arise:
 1) fdi + fdi (with spillover):
8
Although we label it 'technological' for evocative reasons, the spillover concerns more
generally the payo relevant knowledge possessed by the MNE, whatever its nature.
9
The crucial assumptions here are that the MNE cannot force a worker to stay within
the rm for two periods and that the manager is wealth constrained. See section 3.2 for
the outcome of the game if these assumptions were relaxed.
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{ (1a) 
I;1
M;h
+
I;2
D;h
  F  
E;1
M;h
+
I;2
M;h
;
{ (1b) 
I;2
M;h
  
2
D;f
< 
I;2
D;h
  F .
 2) fdi + fdi (without spillover):
{ (2a) 
I;1
M;h
 
E;1
M;h
+
2
D;f
;
{ (1b) does not hold: 
I;2
M;h
  
2
D;f
 
I;2
D;h
  F .
 3) exports + fdi:
{ (3a) 
I;1
M;h
 
E;1
M;h
+min
n

I;2
M;h
  
I;2
D;h
+ F;
2
D;f
o
:
The above conditions are of straightforward interpretation. Condition
(1a) says that rm h prefers to invest rather than to export (and vice versa)
when it anticipates that spillovers would occur if it made a FDI. Condition
(1b) determines the result of the hiring process (which takes place if rm
h has established a local aliate): if it holds, the informed worker will be
hired by the local rm f (and vice versa). If condition (2a) holds then rm h
prefers investing abroad to exporting when it anticipates that it would keep
the informed worker (paying her a rent) in the second period. Condition
(3a) states that exports are chosen when neither (1a) or (2a) hold.
To better interpret the results, let us introduce the following denition:
Denition: We say that the 'joint prot' eect holds (does not
hold) if the sum of the gross prots of two duopolists is smaller
or equal (larger) than the gross prots of a single monopolist.
10
By inspection of the equilibrium conditions above one can infer the fol-
lowing:
Remark 1: A sucient condition for technological spillovers
never to arise is that the 'joint prot' eect holds.
10
With homogenous goods, the joint-prot condition is satised under both quantity
and price competition. If goods are independent, it does not hold for either form of
competition. For any given degree of product dierentiation, it is more likely to hold
under quantity than under price competition, since in the former case market competition
is less strong and duopoly prots higher.
8
The 'joint prot' eect implies that 
I;2
M;h
 
2
D;f
+ 
I;2
D;h
. This is suf-
cient to ensure that condition (1b) does not hold and the local rm will
not hire the informed manager. This result is reminiscent of the literature
which studies persistence of leadership over time. Indeed, the 'joint prot
eect', also called 'eciency eect', has been identied as the main condi-
tion under which a monopolist manages to keep o potential entrants (e.g.,
Tirole, 1988, and Budd et al.,1993).
Note that for the technological spillovers to occur at equilibrium the fact
that the 'joint prot' eect does not hold is not enough. Two conditions are
needed. Firstly, duopoly prots net of the cost of training a second worker
must be superior to the monopoly prot (the joint-prot eect has been
dened gross of training costs). Secondly, the MNE should not nd it more
advantageous to resort to export in the rst period to avoid the dissipation
of technological advantage in the second period.
The 'joint prot' eect does not hold when the duopolists are not ercely
competing against each other. This could be due, for instance, to the lo-
cal rm producing a good which is only an imperfect substitute, or even
complementary, to the one produced by the MNE
11
.
The following two remarks are related to the type of knowledge acquired
by the informed manager and the contribution it can give to the prot of
the local rm.
Remark 2: The lower is the value of the informed manager for
the local rm, the more likely the MNE keeps her.
Remark 3: Conditional on the MNE keeping the informed man-
ager in the second period, the lower is the value of the manager
for the local rm, the more likely is FDI in the rst period.
Remark 2 states that the lower 
2
D;f
, the more dicult for the local rm
to hire the informed manager. When the manager is more productive in
the MNE, the local rm will attach lower value than the aliate to her,
and will oer her a lower salary. This could be the case when there exist
complementarities between the (physical or intangible) assets of the MNE
and the manager's expertise.
11
Anecdotal evidence and case studies report that local rms in less developed countries
often specialize in specic inputs or services for the MNE. For instance, Pack (1993) reports
that the destination of former trained local managers of MNEs in the chemical industry in
Taiwan during the mid 1980s was an entirely dierent sector of activity for a third of the
cases. When local rms compete against the MNE they try to dierentiate the product
they sell from the one produced by the MNE.
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When the local rm attaches less value to the informed manager, the
MNE will have to pay a lower informational rent to her. Remark 3 says
that since it is less costly to avoid the dissipation of knowledge associated
to the FDI strategy, such a strategy is more likely to occur at equilibrium.
For instance, in the extreme case where the informed manager might be
productive only if she can use special facilities uniquely possessed by the
MNE, then the MNE could keep the worker by paying her the reservation
wage and there is no risk of dissipating technology: exports would never be
chosen in the rst period.
3 Extensions
In this section we deal with two dierent extensions. In the rst one, we
analyze the case of asymmetric information between the MNE and the local
rm about the value of the informed manager. In the second, we analyze
other contractual arrangements which have sofar been excluded.
3.1 Asymmetric information case
In this subsection we assume that the local rm observes the existence of the
MNE's superior technology, but it does not know the exact prot it would
obtain by hiring the informed manager. This might happen because the local
rm does not know how the knowledge accumulated by the local manager
interacts with the (exogenous) assets possessed by the rms. Instead, the
MNE knows exactly the value the local manager brings to the local rm.
For simplicity the value that the informed manager gives to the local
rm is either high or low. Local rm's prots are 
2
D;f
(gross of the wage
paid to the manager) in the former case. In the latter case the local rm's
gross prots are 0.
12
If the MNE keeps the manager, its gross prots in the
second period are 
I;2
M;h
. If the MNE does not keep the manager, its second
period prots are 
I;2
D;h
  F if the manager is of high type, and 
I;2
M;h
  F if
she is of low type.
The local rm has the prior belief that the manager gives high value
with probability
e
, 0 <
e
 < 1. After the MNE has chosen whether to export
or invest in the rst period, the local rm updates its belief about whether
the manager is of high or low type. We denote by  the updated belief.
12
Following the above example, this occurs if the manager is unable to exploit her
knowledge once separated from some assets possessed uniquely by the MNE.
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Finally, we keep assumptions A1 to A4.
3.1.1 The Equilibrium of the Game
We look for a perfect bayesian equilibrium of the game by solving it backwards
13
.
3.1.2 The Second Period
In the second period there are two dierent nodes to consider since the MNE
has the possibility either to invest or to export in the rst period.
(a) First, we look at the node where the MNE chooses FDI in the rst
period. Here, there are two dierent cases depending on whether the local
rm's valuation of the manager, 
2
D;f
, is lower or higher than the MNE's
highest valuation, 
I;2
M;h
 
I;2
D;h
+ F .
(a1): 
2
D;f
 
I;2
M;h
  
I;2
D;h
+ F:
The MNE plays according to dierent strategies depending on the man-
ager's type. The local rm, on the other hand, cannot observe the manager's
type, and it always plays according to the same strategy. It can be shown
that:
Lemma 1: The following mixed strategies constitute an equilib-
rium in the second period of the game when the local rm holds
the belief , where 0 <  < 1. The local rm randomizes among
all oers y 2 [0; 
2
D;f
] according to the distribution function
Z(), where
Z(y) =

I;2
M;h
  
2
D;f
  (
I;2
D;h
  F )
h

I;2
M;h
  (
I;2
D;h
  F )  y
i
: (1)
If the manager is of low type the MNE oers 0; if she is of
high type the MNE randomizes among all oers x 2 [0; 
2
D;f
]
according to the distribution function H(), where
13
As tie-breaking rule we assume that the MNE wins all ties in case (a1) and the local
rm wins all ties in case (a2). As before the choice of the tie-breaking rule is due merely
to technical reasons.
11
H(x) =
(1  )x
(
2
D;f
  x)
: (2)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 1: The MNE's expected prot in equilibrium is: 
I;2
M;h
 

2
D;f
if the manager is of high type, and 
I;2
M;h
  [1  ()]F if
she is of low type, where
() 

I;2
M;h
  
2
D;f
  (
I;2
D;h
  F )

I;2
M;h
  (
I;2
D;h
  F )
; (3)
which is the (positive) probability that the local rm oers a zero
wage to the informed worker
14
.
The expected equilibrium prot of the local rm is 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that if  = 1 or  = 0 the mixed strategy equilibrium described
above collapses. Since  = 1 corresponds to the symmetric information case,
we consider the same equilibrium as in the previous section where the local
rm oers 
2
D;f
for the informed manager. For  = 0 the local rm oers 0
to the manager and the MNE keeps her.
(a2): 
2
D;f
> 
I;2
M;h
  
I;2
D;h
+ F:
In this case the local rm has the highest expected valuation of the man-
ager both when she is of high and low type. In the equilibrium we shall focus
on, the local rm oers 
I;2
M;h
  
I;2
D;h
+ F for the informed manager, and
hires her
15
. The MNE oers F when she is of low type and 
I;2
M;h
 
I;2
D;h
+F
when she is of high type.
(b) If the MNE chooses to export in the rst period, A1 guarantees that
second period prots are 
I;2
M;h
  F   G:
14
The fact that the local rm puts positive probability mass on the zero wage bid implies
that the MNE might keep the manager even when she is of low type. In this case, the
MNE keeps the worker at zero cost and saves the training cost F .
15
Here, as in the basic model, there exist other equilibria where the MNE oers more
than its valuation of the manager. Since oering more than its own valuation is a weakly
dominated strategy, as before, we disregard these equilibria.
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3.1.3 The First Period
If rm h chooses FDI in the rst period, its second period prots, conditional
on , depend on the manager's type. The mode of serving the market in
the rst period (exports or FDI) can therefore potentially signal the type
of manager to the local rm. First, we show that no separating equilibrium
generically exists. Then, we characterize the pooling equilibria and nally
the semiseparating equilibria.
In a separating equilibrium the MNE chooses dierent actions for dier-
ent manager's types, and the local rm can infer the manager's type from
the MNE's rst period action. However, the following holds:
Lemma 2: Generically, no separating equilibrium exists when
the equilibrium in the second period is as given in Lemma 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In a pooling equilibrium the MNE chooses the same mode of internation-
alization (either exports or FDI) for both types of managers. It is possible
to prove that:
Lemma 3: The MNE chooses to export in the rst period for
both types of managers if: 
I;1
M;h
 
E;1
M;h
+ [1  ()]F:
It chooses to make a FDI in the rst period if:

I;1
M;h
 
E;1
M;h
+ min
n
e

2
D;f
;
I;2
M;h
 
I;2
D;h
+ F
o
:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Finally, the following lemma identies the only possible semi-separating
equilibrium.
Lemma 4: The only semi-separating equilibrium is one where
MNE chooses FDI when the manager is of high type, and ran-
domizes between FDI and exports when she is of high type. This
equilibrium holds for:

I;1
M;h
< 
E;1
M;h
+Min
n
e

2
D;f
;
I;2
M;h
 
I;2
D;h
+ F
o
: (4)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that lemmas 2 to 4 characterize the equilibrium of the game for
the whole parameter space.
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Conclusions
We now summarize the analysis of the asymmetric information case,
and compare its equilibrium outcome with that obtained under symmetric
information. The three pooling equilibrium solutions and the conditions
under which they arise are the following.
 1') fdi + fdi (with 'probability one' spillover
16
):
{ (1a) 
I;1
M;h
+
I;2
D;h
  F  
E;1
M;h
+
I;2
M;h
;
{ (1b') 
I;2
M;h
 
e

2
D;f
< 
I;2
D;h
  F .
 2') fdi + fdi (without 'probability one' spillover):
{ (2a') 
I;1
M;h
 
E;1
M;h
+
e

2
D;f
;
{ (1b') does not hold: 
I;2
M;h
 
e

2
D;f
 
I;2
D;h
  F .
 3') exports + fdi:
{ (3a') 
I;1
M;h
 
E;1
M;h
+ [1  ()]F .
In the rst equilibrium, the MNEmakes a FDI for both types of manager,
and the local rm hires her in the second period with probability one. In
the second equilibrium, the MNE invests in the rst period for both types
of manager, and the local rm hires the high type manager with positive
probability. In the third equilibrium, exports are chosen by the MNE for
both types of manager in the rst period, and no spillover will occur in the
second.
These results show that technological spillovers always arise with some
probability unless exports are chosen. However, it would be incorrect to
conclude necessarily that technological spillovers are more likely to occur
under asymmetric information. Indeed:
Remark 4: The equilibrium with FDI and 'probability one'
spillovers is less likely to arise under asymmetric information.
16
With an abuse of terminology we use the word 'spillover' to identify any situation
where turnover occurs. Obviously, the local rm might in many instances hire a manager
who turns out to be ex-post of low type.
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This follows immediately from the observation that the condition (1b')
is more restrictive than (1b), its equivalent under symmetric information.
From the comparison of the equilibrium conditions under symmetric and
asymmetric information we can also state the following.
Remark 5: FDI is more likely to occur under asymmetric in-
formation.
The conditions under which the MNE prefers FDI to exports are given
by (1a) and (2a) under symmetric information, and by (1a) and (2a') under
asymmetric information. The remark follows from (2a') being less stringent
a condition than (2a). Remark 5 has its mirror image in the following:
Remark 6: Exports are less likely to occur under asymmetric
information.
To see this result, note that condition (3a') is stronger than condition
(3a) because [1  ()]F < 
I;2
M;h
 
2
D;f
+ F (from A3) and [1  ()]F <
e

2
D;f
< 
2
D;f
(as shown in the Appendix).
Remarks 4 to 6 only concern pooling equilibria. If we also include the
area with a semi-separating equilibrium, the regions where FDI and exports
can occur are larger than indicated by conditions (1') to (3'). However the
region where exports are chosen under asymmetric information is always
smaller than under symmetric information. This follows from (3a') and (4)
being a more stringent condition than (3a).
The intuition behind Remarks 5 and 6 is as follows. Under asymmetric
information the local rm oers less to the manager than under symmetric
information
17
. This makes FDI more attractive compared to the exports,
as the MNE has to pay less to keep the manager. Exports are less likely to
be chosen, and FDI is more likely to be chosen, relative to the symmetric
information case.
17
There are two reasons why the local rm oers less to the manager under asymmetric
information than under symmetric information: 1) for a given 
2
D;f
the informed manager
has a priori a lower expected value under asymmetric information, since she is worthless to
the local rm with probability (1 ); 2) the MNE is better informed about the manager's
type than the local rm is. The MNE therefore oers more to the manager when she is
of high type rm than when she is of low type. The local rm's probability of hiring a
manager of high type is therefore lower than . Hence, the local rm oers, in expected
terms, less than the prior expected value of the manager, 
2
D;f
.
15
3.2 Dierent contractual arrangements
In this subsection we study how our results change by introducing contrac-
tual arrangements which dier from the one considered so far. For simplicity
we use the symmetric information framework.
3.2.1 Two-period binding contract
A two-period contract rules out the possible turnover of the informed man-
ager in the second period. Thus, spillovers do not arise and the informed
manager is hired at the reservation wage (w = 0). In this case, the model
reduces a simple one-period decision between FDI and exports. This sug-
gests that spillovers through workers' mobility are more likely to arise in
countries where clauses binding workers to their employers are illegale. In
some countries, there exist 'condentiality clauses' and other clauses which
make the hiring of trained managers more costly, thus reducing spillovers.
3.2.2 No wealth constraint
If the informed manager is not wealth constrained (for instance, because
she can ask for a bank loan), the MNE anticipates her second period extra
wage and therefore asks for a negative rst period wage (either w =  
2
D;f
if she will stay at the subsidiary or w =  
I;1
M;h
+
I;2
D;h
  F if she will move
to a local rm). This pushes to zero the two-period compensation of the
informed manager (no informational rents can arise).
It is easy to see that under the set of assumptions we have imposed,
exports are never chosen at equilibrium. FDI is always the rst period
internationalization strategy and the existence of technological spillovers is
driven by inequality (1b).
3.2.3 The Manager Buys the Aliate
Suppose the MNE sells the aliate to the manager in the second period.
The manager then internalizes the loss the MNE incurs if the local rm
acquires the better technology. In the second period the manager has an
income of 
I;2
M;h
if she stays with the MNE, and (
I;2
D;h
  F ) plus the wage
in the local rm if she leaves
18
.
19
18
Here, it is assumed that the MNE then brings in another manager.
19
We have assumed that technology is not contractible, and it is therefore an issue
whether the manager ex-post would be willing to reveal her knowledge to the local rm.
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Case 1: 
I;2
M;h
 (
I;2
D;h
  F ) + 
2
D;f
In equilibrium the local rm oers 
2
D;f
to the manager, but she stays
with the MNE as it gives the highest income. The price of the aliate is de-
cided in a bargaining process between the MNE and the manager. The man-
ager will pay up to 
I;2
M;h
, and the MNE will not accept a price lower than the
prot it obtains if the manager does not buy the aliate, 
I;2
M;h
 (
I;2
D;h
 F ).
The price has therefore to belong to [
I;2
M;h
  (
I;2
D;h
  F );
I;2
M;h
], but which
price actually arises depends on the bargaining power of the two parties. If
the MNE has all the bargaining power, FDI is always preferred to exports.
If on the other hand the manager has all the bargaining power, the analysis
in section 2 is unaltered.
Case 2: 
I;2
M;h
< (
I;2
D;h
  F ) + 
2
D;f
In this case the manager leaves the MNE even if she is the residual
claimant. Selling the aliate to the manager does therefore not change the
outcome of the game.
To summarize, selling the aliate to the manager does not change her
decision between leaving or staying with the MNE. The region with FDI
and spillover is therefore the same as in section 2. In the region where
the MNE keeps the manager, the MNE can however reduce the manager's
informational rents by selling her the aliate (as long as the MNE has some
bargaining power vis-a-vis the manager). FDI becomes therefore relatively
more attractive compared to exports and the region with exports is reduced.
4 A parametric example
Here we analyze the same game discussed in section 3 but we introduce a
parametric model to gain insights about the role played by some economic
variables. We also relax assumptions A1, A2 and A4 and keep A3 for ex-
positional convenience. For simplicity we use the symmetric information
framework.
We adopt a version of a model proposed by Singh and Vives (1984).
Assume that in the foreign country identical consumers are endowed with a
In our model this problem can however be overcome by a simple contract making the
manager's wage conditional on the second period prot of the local rm.
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utility function of the following form:
U(x
h
; x
f
; z) = x
h
+ ax
f
 
1
2

x
2
h
+ x
2
f
+ 2gx
h
x
f

+ z (5)
where z is a good produced in a competitive numeraire sector and x
h
, x
f
are dierentiated goods produced at zero marginal cost respectively by the
MNE and by the local rm (if it obtains the technology).
The parameter a introduces an asymmetry between the two goods which
are symmetric for a = 1. If a < 1 the local rm has a cost disadvantage
with respect to the MNE; if a > 1, it has a cost advantage
20
.
The goods are substitutes, independent or complements according to
whether g > 0, g = 0 or g < 0 respectively. We assume g  1, with g = 1
corresponding to the case where x
h
and x
f
are perfect substitutes
21
. The
degree of product dierentiation is measured by 1=g
2
, so that a decrease in
g raises dierentiation between the products.
From the utility maximization of the consumers and from X
it
= S
t
x
i
,
with i = h; f and t = 1; 2, one obtains the following inverse demand struc-
ture:
p
i
= 1 
X
it
+ gX
jt
S
t
; i; j = h; f ; i 6= j; (6)
where S
t
is the size of (i.e., the number of consumers in) the foreign market
in period t = 1; 2 and X
h
, X
f
are total quantities sold by each rm.
We assume that if a duopoly structure emerges in the second period,
rms compete in quantities
22
. We also denote by  (0    1) the unit
export cost (transportation cost or tari) which the MNE has to bear when
serving the foreign market through exports
23
.
Since this model is identical to the one analyzed in section 3 we only need
to replace the implicit payo expressions obtained there by the following
20
Note that with a < 1 and c
f
= 0 (where c
f
is the constant marginal cost of production
of good x
f
) the model is identical to one where a = 1 and c
f
= 1  a.
21
A reduction in g also increases the global expenditure of the consumers - thus increas-
ing market size, a feature present in other models of product dierentiation. It would be
possible to rewrite the demand functions so that the parameter g does not aect aggre-
gate demand. The qualitative results being unchanged, we have preferred to maintain this
formulation which simplies the presentation.
22
Assuming price instead of quantity competition does not aect the qualitative results
of the paper: it just makes it more likely for the 'joint-prot' eect to hold and hence
more dicult for spillovers to occur at equilibrium.
23
In this specic model, parameter  might also be interpreted as the production cost
advantage of the host country with respect the home country.
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closed form expressions:

I;t
M;h
=
S
t
4
; 
E;t
M;h
=
S
t
(1  )
2
4
; t = 1; 2: (7)

I;2
D;h
= S
2

2  ga
4  g
2

2
; 
2
D;f
= S
2

2a  g
4  g
2

2
: (8)

E;2
D;h
= S
2

2  2   ga
4  g
2

2
; 
2
D;f
(E) = S
2

2a  g + g
4  g
2

2
: (9)
Note that the last expression (9) was not needed in section 2 since we
were assuming that the MNE would never export in the second period.
Finally, to simplify notation we normalize to one the sum of market sizes
over the two periods, denoting by  and 1  the foreign country market size
respectively in period 1 and 2. Variables such as G and F should therefore
be reinterpreted as divided by the sum of market sizes. Assumptions A1
and A2 can be restated as:
A1': (2  )   4
G+F
1 
;
A2': (2     ag)  
F
1 
(
4 g
2
)
2
4
.
Inequalities A1' and A2' are not any longer assumptions
24
, but they are
needed to identify in which branch of the game tree we locate (see Figure
1).
To simplify the presentation we x the values of all parameters but g and
a (the degree of product dierentiation and the degree of asymmetry between
duopolists) and analyze the solution in the plane (a; g). Then we make
comparative statics exercises by changing the value of one of the previously
xed parameters.
The benchmark case is reported in Figure 2, which is drawn for the
following values: G =
1
32
; F =
1
32
;  =
1
2
;  = 0:3. The loci (1a), (1b) and
(2b) dene the equilibrium outcomes of the game. They correspond to the
conditions we had analyzed in section 2, and therefore we do not repeat
comments on their interpretation. The locus representing A1' is omitted
from the graph because such inequality is satised for the values considered
24
The only assumption we still keep is A3, which turns out to be satised for values
of g > 0. If this assumption was removed, there would exist a complementarity between
the goods produced by the MNE and the local rm. The former would therefore have an
incentive to reveal its technology to the latter, and spillovers would trivially arise.
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in this gure. The locus representing A2' has been reported for completeness
but it plays no role.
Let us now discuss the results obtained. First, as pointed out in section
2, only when the products are rather imperfect substitutes (low values of
g) can technological spillovers exist. Put dierently, the weaker product
market competition the more likely that the local rm will hire the informed
manager. Second, technological spillover is more likely to occur the more
symmetric the rms are. When a is very small the local rm has no chance
to hire the informed manager. When a is very large the MNE anticipates
the duopoly structure which would arise in period 2 if it made a FDI, and
chooses to export in the rst period in order to avoid it. Third, exports may
be chosen in the rst period either to avoid the dissipation of the technology
to the local competitor, or to save second period extra wage to the informed
manager. In either case, the incentive to resort to an export strategy is the
stronger the more substitutable the goods (higher g) and the more ecient
the local competitor (higher a).
Now that we have built this benchmark case we can do some comparative
statics.
In Figure 3(i) we show the eect of an increase in transportation costs or
taris ( rises from 0:3 to 0:4). Since the export strategy is more costly, the
region where FDI occurs at equilibrium expands (the curve (2a) shifts to the
right). This can be thought of as the traditional 'tari-jumping' motivation
for FDI and it is a well-known outcome (see Motta, 1992). However, the
increase in  also reduces the protability of resorting to exports to avoid
dissipation of technology or extra wage. Hence, spillovers are more likely
to occur at equilibrium (both curves (1a) and (2a) shift to the right). This
implies that taris or other similar policy instruments might be used to at-
tract new technology into the country. According to Siotis (1997), this is
precisely the policy followed by the European Commission to appropriate
leading technology possessed by the Japanese in the parts and components
consumer electronics industry. He reports that Japanese rms had used only
exports and avoided licensing agreements and FDIs in the EU as a way to
preserve their technological edge. Since changes in quotas and taris were
ruled out by the EU commitment in the Uruguay Round negotiations, the
European Commission threatened to use other measures such as antidump-
ing duties and safeguard clauses to discourage Japanese exports, promote
investments, and create technological spillovers.
Figure 3(ii) illustrates the changes due to a reduction in training costs F .
When F decreases the MNE oers less for the informed manager because
20
its outside option becomes more valuable (it is less costly to bring new
instructors into the foreign country). This shifts the (1b) curve upwards
and makes spillovers more likely. Further, the decrease in training costs
F also implies that the MNE would save less by resorting to exports in
the rst period (condition (1a) is relaxed and the associated curve shifts
upwards), and this increases the region where FDI-cum-spillovers arises.
Any policy which might decrease such costs would therefore be welcome if
it helped create spillovers which otherwise would not arise. A higher level of
education in the local workforce, which would make it easier the instruction
of local managers, might be an example of such a situation.
Figure 3(iii) shows the eects of a decrease in , that is an increase in
the relative importance of second period prots. Obviously, this increases
the value attached to preserving the technology (future prots are relatively
more important), which in turn explains the existence of a larger region
where exports are chosen in the rst period of the game. It has often been
observed that modes of internationalization tend to evolve over time, with
exports being used in the early periods of foreign involvement, followed by
FDI in later periods. For instance Nicholas (1983) reports that 88 per-
cent of his sample of British MNEs in the pre-1939 period sold their prod-
ucts initially through exports before converting to direct sales or production
branches. There are probably other stories which explain better this evolu-
tion - like the desire to know better a market before committing important
resources (Horstmann and Markusen, 1996) - but our results suggest that
the attempt to keep the technological potential intact might also play a role
in certain circumstances.
Finally, Figure 3(iv) shows the eect of an increase in G, the xed costs
which should be incurred to operate a foreign subsidiary in a country where
a rm had not been previously established. While the result of such an
increase is obvious and expected (exports are more likely), we report this
diagram especially as an example of what happens when inequality A1' is
not satised. Indeed, under the parameters' congurations chosen we have
that the MNE chooses to export in both periods.
The analysis of this simple parametric model conrms the main intuitions
obtained from the more general models studied in section 2 and 3. It also
allows us to gain some insights on how specic variables aect the possibility
to observe spillovers through workers' mobility. In particular, spillovers are
more likely to occur the more similar the technological capabilities of the
MNE and the local rm (a is close to 1); the higher transport costs and
taris; the higher the educational level of the local workforce, which implies
21
lower training costs; the lower the degree of substitutability g between the
goods produced by the MNE and the local rm (this makes it more likely
for the 'eciency' or 'joint-prot' eect underlined in section 2 to hold).
The last point deserves further comments. The fact that the informed
manager is hired by a local rm which is not a close competitor of the MNE
implicitly requires that the knowledge acquired by the manager is broad
enough. Therefore, the result that spillovers occur more frequently when
the degree of substitution between goods is low can be reinterpreted as say-
ing that spillovers are more frequent when the MNE gives its manager a
broader know-how. In other terms, one should expect workers having gen-
eral skills to be more easily involved in moving from MNE to local rms.
Welfare
In our model the dierent equilibrium congurations can be easily ranked
in terms of welfare of the host country. FDI is preferred to exports, since
it saves transport costs (which benets consumers), it raises government
revenues if the aliate's prot is taxed, and it gives informational rents to
the local manager. In turn, FDI with spillovers is preferred to a situation
where after FDI the aliate keeps the manager, since by hiring her the local
rm would make prot that it could not earn otherwise.
The fact that FDI is always better than export is obviously the result
of the simple structure of our model. It is well known that there exist
circumstances where FDI is detrimental to the host country. For instance,
the establishment of a foreign aliate might pre-empt the entry of a local
rm (see Motta, 1992), or foreign aliates might rely on imports from the
home country, thus displacing host production (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996). The
model is therefore not adequate to evaluate whether FDI is welfare improving
or not with respect to exports.
This qualication made, one can wonder whether - within the framework
developed here - there exists any policy instrument which a host country
might use to improve its welfare. The comparative statics exercise carried
out in this section would seem to suggest such a conclusion. In certain re-
gions of parameter values, by giving a subsidy to nance (part of) the xed
costs of the MNE, by contributing to the expenses incurred to train local
workers, or by raising a tari, the local government can attract FDIs and
facilitate the creation of spillovers. Specically, this improvement occurs
when these interventions would change the equilibrium outcome in a given
region of the parameter space. For instance, Figure 3(ii) shows that there
exists a region where a decrease in training costs might result in an equilib-
22
rium with spillovers, whereas no spillovers would have arisen in the absence
of government intervention.
Nevertheless, the welfare improvement is conditional on the change in
the equilibrium outcome, and entails an important discontinuity.
25
If the
government is not able to predict the outcome of the game with sucient
precision, it might give a subsidy to the MNE when spillovers would take
place anyhow; or it might give a subsidy which is insucient to move the
equilibrium outcome to a region with spillovers. The subsidy might there-
fore result in a welfare loss for the host country, or might not improve it.
This implies that strong informational requirements are needed to ensure
that a government can intervene to improve welfare. Extreme caution must
therefore be taken before arriving at any strong policy conclusion.
5 Summary and conclusions
Spillovers have often been treated as a 'black box' mechanism, where their
nature is left unspecied. In this paper we provided a specic mechanism
through which technology and knowledge might unvoluntarily move from a
rm towards others located in the same country. Therefore, this paper oers
a rationale to the empirical literature which has uncovered the importance
of localized spillovers (e.g., Audretsch and Feldman, 1996).
We have presented a model where technological spillovers from FDIs
might occur due to workers' mobility. A MNE can transfer a superior tech-
nology to its foreign aliate only after having trained local managers. Once
informed, these managers can later be hired by a local rm and technologi-
cal spillovers might occur. Even when such spillovers do not take place, the
host country welfare might improve because of the informational rent that
trained managers receive by the MNE to prevent them from moving to a
local rm.
We have also showed that in some circumstances a MNE might prefer to
resort to exports rather than FDIs, precisely to avoid dissipation of superior
technology to local rivals and/or the payment of informational rents to local
workers.
Our model helps identify the conditions under which a MNE keeps the
informed workers, and those under which they leave to a local rm. The
results are consistent with the industrial organization literature on persis-
25
See Horstmann and Markusen (1992) for similar discontinuities in equilibria in a model
of choice between FDI and exports.
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tence of monopolies. Spillovers arise (the monopoly ceases to exist) when
the 'joint-prot' (or 'eciency') eect holds, that is, when industry prots
are higher if both rms can use the technology. This is more likely to hap-
pen when the local and the MNE are not close competitors, and when the
knowledge acquired by the workers is broad rather than specic.
We have also analyzed how other variables would aect the existence of
such spillovers induced by workers' mobility. In particular, we have found
that spillovers are the more likely to arise the more similar the technological
levels of local rms and MNEs, and the lower the costs of training the local
workforce.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1 and Corollary 1
The MNE plays according to dierent strategies depending on the manager's
type. The local rm, on the other hand, cannot observe the manager's
type, and it plays according to the same strategy. We use the following
notation: x is the MNE's oer to the manager when she is of high type,
q is its oer when she is of low type, y is the local rm's oer. Z() is
the cumulative distribution function used by the local rm to randomize
its oers. The MNE randomizes according to H() when the manager is of
high type. The corresponding density functions are h() and z(). H(y; x)
is H() as a function of x evaluated at y, and Z(x; y) is Z() as a function
y evaluated at x. E(
2
i
) is the expected second period equilibrium prot of
rm i.
First, we derive the local rm's equilibrium strategy, and the MNE's
equilibrium strategy when the manager is of high type. To nd these strate-
gies we assume that the MNE's equilibrium strategy is q = 0 when the
manager is of low type. Then, we verify that q = 0 is indeed an equilibrium.
Consider the problem of the local rm. No matter the belief it holds, it
will never oer more than 
2
D;f
. In equilibrium the local rm randomizes
according to the density function that maximizes its expected prots given
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H(). It follows from the equilibrium strategies given in Lemma 1 that
the MNE does not put positive probability on any oer in the equilibrium
support, and z() therefore solves the following maximization problem:
Max
z(y)
Z

2
D;f
0
z(y)
h
H(y; x)(
2
D;f
  y) + (1  )(0  y)
i
dy (10)
where
h
H(y; x)(
2
D;f
  y) + (1  )(0  y)
i
is the expected pay-o from
playing y given ; q = 0, and H(). From (10) it follows that the local
rm never oers more than 
2
D;f
, its expected valuation of the manager.
The MNE wins all ties and therefore will not oer more than 
2
D;f
. In
the equilibrium we construct, both rms randomize among all oers in the
interval [0; 
2
D;f
]. The local rm only plays a mixed strategy if all oers
bring the same expected pay-o given  and H(). Hence, it has to hold for
all y 2 [0; 
2
D;f
] that:
H(y; x)(
2
D;f
  y) + (1  )(0  y) = E(
2
f
): (11)
From (11) one obtains:
H(x) =
E(
2
f
) + (1  )x
(
2
D;f
  x)
: (12)
Now, consider the problem of the MNE. In equilibrium the MNE ran-
domizes according to the density function that maximizes its expected prots
given Z(). Therefore h() solves:
Max
h(x)
Z

2
D;f
0
h(x)
h
Z(x; y)(
I;2
M;h
  x) + (1  Z(x; y))(
I;2
D;h
  F )
i
dx
(13)
where
h
Z(x; y)(
I;2
M;h
  x) + (1  Z(x; y))(
I;2
D;h
  F )
i
is the expected prot
from playing x. In equilibrium all oers in [0; 
2
D;f
] have to give the same
expected pay-o given Z(). Hence, for all x 2 [0; 
2
D;f
] :
Z(x; y)(
I;2
M;h
  x) + [1  Z(x; y)] (
I;2
D;h
  F ) = E(
2
h
): (14)
From (14) one obtains:
Z(y) =
E(
h
)  (
I;2
D;h
  F )

I;2
M;h
  (
I;2
D;h
  F )  y
: (15)
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Since the maximal oer of both rms is 
2
D;f
, then H(
2
D;f
) = 1 and
Z(
2
D;f
) = 1. From (15) and (12) it follows:
E(
2
h
) = 
I;2
M;h
  
2
D;f
; E(
2
f
) = 0: (16)
Finally, inserting (16) respectively in (15) and (12) one obtains the dis-
tribution functions given in Lemma 1.
In deriving H() and Z() we have been assuming that q = 0. The only
thing left to show is therefore that q = 0 is a best response to Z(). If
the MNE loses the manager, its second period prot is 
I;2
M;h
  F , while
if it keeps her, its second period prot is 
I;2
M;h
  q: Therefore the MNE's
expected prot from playing q is given by:
Z(q; y)(
I;2
M;h
  q) + (1  Z(q; y))(
I;2
M;h
  F ): (17)
By inserting (15) in (17) and maximizing with respect to q, it is easy to
show that q = 0 is the best response to the strategy of the local rm. QED
6.2 Proof of Lemma 2
We have two candidate separating equilibria: 1) the MNE exports when the
manager is of high type, and does FDI when the manager is of low type; 2)
the MNE chooses FDI when the manager is of high type, and exports when
the manager is of low type.
In the rst candidate equilibrium the MNE's prot is given by 
E;1
M;h
+

I;2
M;h
  F   G if the manager is of the high type.
Now, suppose that the MNE instead of exporting would deviate and do
FDI in the rst period. The local rm would hold the belief  = 0 in the
second period, and the MNE's two-period prot would be 
I;1
M;h
  F  G+

I;2
M;h
. Due to exporting costs we have that 
I;1
M;h
 
E;1
M;h
, thus implying
that the MNE would deviate: the rst candidate cannot be an equilibrium.
The proof showing that the second candidate equilibrium cannot be sus-
tained as an equilibrium follows the same lines and we omit it for shortness.
QED
6.3 Proof of Lemma 3
We have to distinguish two dierent cases: 1) 
I;2
M;h
  
I;2
D;h
+ F 
e

2
D;f
;
2) 
I;2
M;h
  
I;2
D;h
+ F <
e

2
D;f
. For each case there are two possible pooling
28
equilibria: one where the MNE chooses FDI for both types of managers,
and another where it chooses exports.
Case 1: 
I;2
M;h
 
I;2
D;h
+ F 
e

2
D;f
Let us rst consider the pooling equilibrium where the MNE chooses FDI
in the rst period. As the MNE chooses FDI for both types of manager,
the local rm's belief in the second period is  =
e
. We look rst at the
MNE's choice when the manager is of the high type. If the MNE plays the
equilibrium strategy, the two-period expected prot is (see Corollary 1):

I;1
M;h
  F  G+ 
I;2
M;h
 
e

2
D;f
: (18)
If the MNE would deviate and choose to export in the rst period, it
would earn:

E;1
M;h
+ 
I;2
M;h
  F  G: (19)
Hence, the MNE does not deviate when the manager is of the high type
i.:

I;1
M;h
 
E;1
M;h

e

2
D;f
: (20)
Instead, if the manager is of low type, we have from Corollary 1 that the
MNE's expected prot is:

I;1
M;h
  F  G+
I;2
M;h
 
h
1  (
e
)
i
F: (21)
Therefore, the MNE does not deviate from the equilibrium strategy i.:

I;1
M;h
  
E;1
M;h

h
1  (
e
)
i
F: (22)
Next, note that
h
1  (
e
)
i
F 
e

2
D;f
. Then, by replacing expression
(3) into this inequality and simplifying, one nds that the inequality holds
insofar as 
I;1
M;h
 
I;2
D;h
, which holds by assumption A3. Hence, the con-
dition for the existence of the pooling equilibrium where the MNE chooses
FDI in the rst period is given by (20).
In the other candidate equilibrium the MNE exports in the rst period
for both types of managers. In this equilibrium we need to specify the out-
of-equilibrium-belief, as how much the local rm oers to the manager in
the second period depends on the belief the local rm holds. For simplicity,
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we assume that the out-of-equilibrium belief is  =
e
. The MNE has an
equilibrium prot of

E;1
M;h
+ 
I;2
M;h
  F  G (23)
for both types of managers. If the MNE deviates and chooses FDI, the prot
is

I;1
M;h
  F   G+
I;2
M;h
 
e

2
D;f
(24)
if the manager is of the high type and

I;1
M;h
  F   G+
I;2
M;h
 
h
1  (
e
)
i
F (25)
if she is of low type. Therefore, the MNE will not deviate i.:

I;1
M;h
  
E;1
M;h
Minf
e

2
D;f
;
h
1  (
e
)
i
Fg =
h
1  (
e
)
i
F: (26)
Case 2: 
I;2
M;h
 
I;2
D;h
+ F <
e

2
D;f
In the pooling equilibrium where the MNE invests in the rst period,
the local rm always hires the informed manager in the second period. The
equilibrium prot is therefore

I;1
M;h
  F  G+ 
I;2
D;h
  F
if the manager is of the high type, and

I;1
M;h
  F  G+ 
I;2
M;h
  F
if she is of low type. If the MNE deviates, the prot is

E;1
M;h
+ 
I;2
M;h
  F  G:
The MNE does not deviate for any type i.:

I;1
M;h
  
E;1
M;h
 
I;2
M;h
  (
I;2
D;h
  F ): (27)
In the equilibrium where the MNE chooses exports in the rst period,
the condition for no deviation is the same as in case 1:

I;1
M;h
  
E;1
M;h

h
1  (
e
)
i
F (28)
QED
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6.4 Semi-Separating equilibria
For each manager's type the MNE can choose FDI, or exports, or to ran-
domize between the two. There are therefore nine candidate equilibria to
consider. Four of the candidate equilibria have already been analyzed as
they are separating or pooling. Here we study the remaining ve semi-
separating equilibria.
Candidate equilibrium 1
The MNE chooses FDI when the manager is of low type, and randomizes
between FDI and exports when the manager is of high type. In the latter
case, the MNE plays FDI with probability p and exports with probability
1  p. If the local rm observes FDI, we have from the Bayes' rule:
 =
p
e

p
e
 + (1 
e
)
: (29)
We have two dierent cases: 1) 
I;2
M;h
  
2
D;f
 
I;2
D;h
  F and 2)

I;2
M;h
  
2
D;f
< 
I;2
D;h
  F .
Case 1: 
I;2
M;h
  
2
D;f
 
I;2
D;h
  F
First, consider the MNE's strategy when the manager is of high type.
Since the MNE randomizes between FDI and exports, the two options have
to give the same expected pay-o:

I;1
M;h
  F  G+ 
I;2
M;h
  
2
D;f
= 
E;1
M;h
+
I;2
M;h
  F  G: (30)
From (30) one obtains:
 =

I;1
M;h
 
E;1
M;h

2
D;f
: (31)
From 
I;2
M;h
  
2
D;f
 
I;2
D;h
  F and (31) it follows:

I;2
M;h
  (
I;1
M;h
 
E;1
M;h
)  
I;2
D;h
  F: (32)
Inequality (32) is a necessary condition for the equilibrium to exist, but
not a sucient condition, since 0 < p < 1 also has to be fullled: It follows
from (29) and (31) that:
 =

I;1
M;h
  
E;1
M;h

2
D;f
=
p
e

p
e
 + (1 
e
)
,
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p =
(1 
e
)(
I;1
M;h
  
E;1
M;h
)
e

h

2
D;f
  (
I;1
M;h
  
E;1
M;h
)
i
: (33)
Expression (33) takes values in the (0; 1)-interval i.:

I;1
M;h
 
E;1
M;h
<
e

2
D;f
: (34)
Inequality (34) is another necessary condition for the equilibrium to exist.
Consider the MNE's strategy when the manager is of low type. The
MNE chooses FDI i.:

I;1
M;h
  F  G+ 
I;2
M;h
  [1  ()]F  
E;1
M;h
+ 
I;2
M;h
  F  G (35)
where the LHS is the prot from choosing FDI and RHS is the prot from
exports. By substituting expressions (3) and (31), inequality (35) reduces
to:

I;2
M;h
 
I;2
D;h
which is always satised given A3. Therefore, inequalities (32) and (34) are
sucient conditions for the existence of the semi-separating equilibrium.
Case 2: 
I;2
M;h
  
2
D;f
< 
I;2
D;h
  F
The MNE randomizes between exports and FDI only if they give the
same expected prot, i.e.:

I;1
M;h
  F   G+
I;2
D;h
  F = 
E;1
M;h
+
I;2
M;h
  F   G: (36)
Clearly, equality (36) does not hold generically.
Candidate equilibrium 2
The MNE chooses FDI when the manager is of high type, and randomizes
between FDI and exports when she is of low type. We need again to identify
two dierent cases: 1) 
I;2
M;h
  
2
D;f
 
I;2
D;h
  F and 2) 
I;2
M;h
  
2
D;f
<

I;2
D;h
  F .
Case 1: 
I;2
M;h
  
2
D;f
 
I;2
D;h
  F
Consider the MNE's strategy when the manager is of the low type. The
MNE randomizes between FDI and exports only if they give the same pay-
o, i.e.:

I;1
M;h
  F  G+
I;2
M;h
  [1  ()]F = 
E;1
M;h
+
I;2
M;h
  F   G: (37)
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By substituting for the value of () one obtains:

I;1
M;h
 F G+
I;2
M;h
 
2
4
1 

I;2
M;h
  
2
D;f
  (
I;2
D;h
  F )

I;2
M;h
  (
I;2
D;h
  F )
3
5
F = 
E;1
M;h
+
I;2
M;h
 F G
from which one derives:
 =
(
I;1
M;h
 
E;1
M;h
)
h

I;2
M;h
  (
I;2
D;h
  F )
i

2
D;f
F
: (38)
The MNE chooses FDI when the manager is of high value if:

I;1
M;h
  F   G+
I;2
M;h
  
2
D;f
 
E;1
M;h
+
I;2
M;h
  F   G (39)
where the LHS is the prot if FDI is chosen and the RHS is the prot from
exporting. By substituting (38) in (39) one obtains:

I;2
M;h
 
I;2
D;h
 0: (40)
It follows from A3 that inequality (40) is never satised, so the candidate
equilibrium is not an equilibrium.
Case 2: 
I;2
M;h
  
2
D;f
< 
I;2
D;h
  F
Following the argument used in case 2 of candidate equilibrium 1, it is
easy to show that also the candidate equilibrium Case 2 is not an equilibrium.
Candidate equilibrium 3
The MNE randomizes between FDI and exports for both types of man-
ager. If the MNE randomizes between exports and FDI,  has to be given
by (38) when the manager is of low type and (31) when the manager is of
high type. Given that the local rm cannot observe the manager's type, 
must be the same for both types. Hence,
 =

I;1
M;h
  
E;1
M;h

2
D;f
=
(
I;1
M;h
 
E;1
M;h
)
h

I;2
M;h
  (
I;2
D;h
  F )
i

2
D;f
F
,
F =
h

I;2
M;h
  (
I;2
D;h
  F )
i
, 
I;2
M;h
  
I;2
D;h
= 0: (41)
From A3 it follows that (41) does not hold, so candidate equilibrium 3
is not an equilibrium.
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There are two candidate equilibria left out: 4) The MNE chooses exports
when the manager if of low type, and randomizes between FDI and exports
when the manager is of high type, and 5) The MNE chooses exports when
the manager is of high type and randomizes between FDI and exports when
the manager is of low type. It can be shown, along the same lines as in the
previous proofs, that these equilibria do not exist generically. To save space,
proofs are omitted. QED
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